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Abstract 1 
We challenge the claim that there are distinct neural systems for explicit and implicit memory 2 
by demonstrating that a formal single-system model predicts the pattern of recognition 3 
memory (explicit) and repetition priming (implicit) in amnesia. In the current investigation, 4 
human participants with amnesia categorized pictures of objects at study and then, at test, 5 
identified fragmented versions of studied (old) and non-studied (new) objects (providing a 6 
measure of priming) and made a recognition memory judgment (old vs. new) for each object. 7 
Numerous results in the amnesic patients were predicted in advance by the single-system 8 
model: 1) deficits in recognition memory and priming were evident relative to a control group; 9 
2) items judged as old were identified at greater levels of fragmentation than items judged 10 
new, regardless of whether the items were actually old or new; 3) the magnitude of the 11 
priming effect (the identification advantage for old vs. new items) overall was greater than 12 
that of items judged new. Model evidence measures also favored the single-system model 13 
over two formal multiple-systems models. The findings support the single-system model, 14 
which explains the pattern of recognition and priming in amnesia primarily as a reduction in 15 
the strength of a single dimension of memory strength, rather than a selective explicit 16 
memory system deficit.  17 
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Introduction 18 
One of the most influential distinctions in the cognitive neuroscience of memory is 19 
between explicit and implicit long-term memory. Explicit memory refers to conscious 20 
recollection of prior experiences. Implicit memory refers to changes in behaviour that are due 21 
to prior experience, but are unaccompanied by conscious recollection of those experiences 22 
(Schacter, 1987). Implicit memory is commonly shown via repetition priming, which is a 23 
change or facilitation in identification, production, or detection of an item (e.g., a picture of 24 
an object) as a result of prior exposure to the same or a similar item. Strikingly, despite 25 
profound deficits in explicit memory tasks such as recognition—in which participants judge 26 
whether items have been presented before in a certain context—individuals with amnesia can 27 
show normal levels of repetition priming (Hamann and Squire, 1997). This dissociation is 28 
widely regarded as some of the strongest evidence for the proposal that functionally and 29 
neurally distinct explicit and implicit memory systems exist in the brain: Recognition is 30 
driven by an explicit (declarative/conscious) memory system located in the medial temporal 31 
lobes (damaged in amnesia), whereas priming is driven by implicit (non-32 
declarative/unconscious) memory systems in modality-specific neocortical regions (Tulving 33 
and Schacter, 1990; Gabrieli, 1998; Squire, 2009). Of primary interest here is the proposal 34 
that recognition and priming are driven by distinct explicit and implicit memory sources 35 
(Squire, 2009). 36 
An alternative perspective is that recognition and repetition priming are driven by the 37 
same memory system or source. This view has been formalised in a single-system (SS) model 38 
of recognition and priming (Berry et al., 2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2012; Shanks and Berry, 39 
2012). Surprisingly, this model can explain numerous results in healthy adults that on the 40 
surface appear to be indicative of multiple systems; it even predicts results that are not 41 
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predicted by multiple-systems versions of the model and can provide better fits to data (Berry 42 
et al., 2012).  43 
Here we provide a critical test of the SS model by applying it to data from amnesia. 44 
We also compare its fit to two formal multiple-systems models. We test a relatively 45 
homogeneous and well-characterized group of amnesic patients that is atypically large (n = 46 
24) (Hayes et al., 2012). The patients had Korsakoff’s syndrome (KS), a chronic disorder that 47 
is often caused by severe alcoholism and thiamine deficiency that results in diencephalic, 48 
frontal, and hippocampal brain damage (Le Berre at al., in press). It is characterized by 49 
anterograde and retrograde amnesia (Kopelman et al., 2009; Fama et al., 2012; Kessels and 50 
Kopelman, 2012; Race and Verfaellie, 2012). Findings from patients with KS have played a 51 
central role in the formulation of multiple-systems views (Hayes et al., 2012) and implicit 52 
memory is widely regarded to be preserved in KS (Kopelman et al., 2009; Oudman et al., 53 
2011). In the current investigation, participants categorized pictures of familiar objects (e.g., 54 
a guitar) at study. At test, participants identified fragmented versions of old (studied) and new 55 
objects (providing a measure of priming) and made a recognition memory judgment (old/new) 56 
after identifying each object.  57 
 58 
Materials and Methods 59 
Participants 60 
Twenty-four patients (16 male; M age = 50.2 years, SD = 7.7) with Korsakoff’s 61 
amnesia were recruited via the Korsakoff Clinic of the Vincent van Gogh Institute for 62 
Psychiatry, Venray, The Netherlands (KOR group). All patients fulfilled the criteria for 63 
alcohol-induced persisting amnestic disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and 64 
Korsakoff’s syndrome (Kopelman, 2002). The diagnoses were supported by the patients’ 65 
medical history and neuropsychological assessment, and all participants had anterograde 66 
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amnesia, performing in the impaired range on the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test 67 
(RBMT) (Wilson et al., 1989; Van Balen et al., 1996) (Total Profile Score M = 6.7, SD = 4.0; 68 
where 17-21 = poor memory, 10-16 = mildly impaired, 0-9 = severely impaired), as well as 69 
retrograde amnesia for their biographical history. Premorbid intelligence was estimated using 70 
the Dutch version of the National Adult Reading Test (Schmand et al., 1991) (NART), with 71 
IQs in the below-average to average range, in agreement with the patients’ educational levels 72 
(M NART-IQ = 93.8, SD = 12.5; M educational level = 3.9, SD = 1.1, where education level 73 
was assessed in 7 categories based on the Dutch educational system, where 1 = primary 74 
school, and 7 = academic degree, Verhage, 1964). Neuroradiological findings (CT or MRI) 75 
showed abnormalities associated with KS, such as (diencephalic) atrophy or white-matter 76 
lesions (Pitel et al., 2012). No brain abnormalities were found that countered the clinical 77 
diagnosis (e.g., large strokes, tumors). All patients were abstinent from alcohol since their 78 
admittance to the clinic (> 3 months prior to testing), none was in the acute Wernicke phase 79 
of the syndrome, and none fulfilled the criteria for alcohol-related dementia (Oslin et al., 80 
1998).  81 
The control group (CON group) also consisted of 24 individuals, matched in terms of 82 
age (M = 50.2 years, SD = 13.6; t(46) = 0.59, P = .56), premorbid IQ (M NART-IQ = 96.4, 83 
SD = 12.6; t(46) = 0.72, P = .47), and proportion of males and females. Exclusion criteria for 84 
the controls were a self-reported history of neurologic or psychiatric disorder, or subjective 85 
cognitive complaints. Level of education (M = 5.3, SD = 0.8) was significantly higher in the 86 
CON group than the KOR group, U = 90.50, P < .01; however, this variable was not found to 87 
be significantly correlated with subsequent measures of recognition or priming performance 88 
at test within each group (rs ranged from -0.14 to 0.23).  89 
 90 
Materials 91 
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The stimuli were 80 color photographs of familiar objects (e.g., a bicycle, a guitar). 92 
All stimuli were presented on a computer monitor against a white background. Each object 93 
subtended approximately 7.5 degrees of visual angle in the horizontal and vertical. Stimuli 94 
were arranged into two 40 item lists. Each list acted as the studied or new stimuli equally 95 
often across participants. Approximately half of the objects in each list were larger than a 96 
shoebox. All instructions were presented in Dutch. 97 
 98 
Procedure 99 
At study, participants were told that they would be presented with pictures of objects 100 
and that they must decide whether each object is smaller or larger in size than a shoebox, 101 
indicating their response with a button press. The sequence of events on each trial was as 102 
follows: a) a central fixation ‘+’ was presented for 2000 ms, b) the object was then presented 103 
for 2000 ms, c) if a response had been made, the next trial then commenced; if a response had 104 
not been made, a blank screen was presented until a response was made. For the duration of 105 
the study phase, the reminder cue “Is the object smaller or larger than a shoebox? Z = smaller, 106 
M = larger” remained visible towards the bottom of the screen. The order of presentation of 107 
items was randomly determined for each participant. There was a short (maximum 5 minutes) 108 
retention interval before the test phase commenced, during which standardised tests (e.g., 109 
NART) were administered. 110 
A continuous identification with recognition (CID-R; Stark and McClelland, 2000) 111 
procedure was used to present each item at test. On each trial an item was initially presented 112 
in an extremely fragmented form. The test phase instructions informed participants that the 113 
object would initially be difficult to identify, but that each press of the spacebar would reveal 114 
a less fragmented version of the object (up to 10 levels, see Fig. 1). Their task was to identify 115 
each object at the most fragmented level that they could. Participants were told not to try to 116 
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identify the object until they were sure that they could do so. Identification accuracy was near 117 
ceiling in both groups, although higher in the CON group: proportion of trials correct, CON 118 
group, M = 0.998; KOR group, M = 0.958 (excluding one outlier in the KOR group who only 119 
identified 0.49 proportion of trials correctly; the recognition/priming results reported later are 120 
not affected if this participant is excluded). Trials on which an incorrect identification 121 
occurred were not excluded from the analysis in order to preserve recognition data; however, 122 
the qualitative pattern of results did not differ when they were excluded (one exception to this 123 
was that Prediction 3 in the KOR group was only significant on a one-tailed test). The prompt 124 
“Press SPACE to reveal more of the drawing, and press ENTER at the earliest point that you 125 
can identify the item correctly” remained on screen during the clarification procedure. When 126 
participants pressed enter, a black outlined box and prompt (“Type your response and then 127 
press ENTER”) appeared beneath the fragmented object. After a response was typed, the 128 
non-fragmented version of the object was then presented with the prompt, “Was the object 129 
presented in the first stage?  1 = sure no, 2 = probably no, 3 = probably yes, 4 = sure yes”. 130 
After participants made their recognition response, a blank screen was presented for 2000 ms 131 
before the next test trial was presented. There were 80 trials in total (40 old and 40 new). To 132 
evenly distribute old and new trial types across the test phase, trials were randomly arranged 133 
into four blocks with an equal number of old and new trials in each block (there was no 134 
indication of block transition to participants). 135 
To create fragmented versions of each image, each 400 × 400 pixel image was 136 
divided into 400 20 × 20 pixel squares. At each of ten possible fragmentation levels, a fixed 137 
proportion of the squares containing the target image were displayed. The proportion of 138 
squares displayed at each fragmentation level x, was calculated as 0.75
(10 - x)
, x  [1, 10]. Thus, 139 
the fragmentation procedure was such that the rate of clarification was relatively slow across 140 
 9 
 
 
the initial fragmentation levels and more rapid in the later stages. This was done to increase 141 
the difficulty of the task in the early stages of the procedure. 142 
Recognition responses were collapsed across confidence ratings “1” and “2” for “new” 143 
judgments, and “3” and “4” ratings for “old” judgments. This was done because a large 144 
proportion of participants made no responses in at least one of the confidence (1 to 4) × item 145 
status (old, new) response categories (79% of individuals in the KOR group, and 71% of 146 
individuals in the CON group). Recognition performance was measured with Pr and d′. Pr 147 
was calculated as, H – F, where H = p(hit), and F = p(false alarm); d′ was calculated as z(H) – 148 
z(F)); a “hit” is an old judgment to an old item, a “false alarm” is an old judgment to a new 149 
item. Response bias was measured with C (C = -0.5[z(H) + z(F)]). For the calculation of d′ 150 
and C, a correction was applied when calculating H and F for each individual (i.e., H = (no. 151 
hits + 0.5) / (no. possible hits + 1), and F = (no. false alarms + 0.5) / (no. possible false 152 
alarms)) (Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988). This enabled calculation of d′ and C for participants 153 
whose H or F equalled 1 or zero. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests, and all 154 
t tests were two-tailed unless indicated. Effect sizes are indicated by Cohen’s d (for t tests) 155 
and ηp
2
 (for ANOVA). 156 
 157 
Reliability of the recognition and priming measures 158 
Prior research has shown that it is important to take into account the reliability of the 159 
tasks used to measure recognition and priming when comparing performance (e.g., Buchner 160 
and Wippich, 2000). Accordingly, the reliability of the recognition and priming measures was 161 
calculated using split-half correlations. Each participant’s dataset was split into odd and even 162 
trials, and then recognition (Pr) and priming measures were calculated for the trials in each of 163 
these halves. The split-half correlation for recognition/priming is the Pearson correlation of 164 
the recognition/priming measures for each half, across participants. Importantly, both 165 
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recognition and priming were highly reliable: recognition, r(46) = .91, P < .001; priming, 166 
r(46) = .56, P < .001. The greater reliability of the recognition task is consistent with 167 
previous research (Buchner and Wippich, 2000), however when each group was analysed 168 
individually, the reliability of recognition was only greater than that of priming in the KOR 169 
group and not the CON group (where the reliability of recognition and priming was 170 
approximately equal): KOR group, recognition, r(22) = .84, P < .001, priming, r(22) = .47, P 171 
= .02; CON group, recognition, r(22) = .50, P = .013, priming, r(22) = .58, P = .003.  172 
 173 
Formal single- and multiple-systems models 174 
Full details of the models are given in Berry et al. (2012). The single-system SS 175 
model is based on signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966) and assumes that at test 176 
each item is associated with a memory strength value, f, which is a normally distributed, 177 
random variable with mean (µ) and standard deviation σf  (i.e., f ~ N(µ, σf)). The mean f of 178 
old items can be greater than of new items because of prior study (i.e., µold ≥ µnew). An item’s 179 
value of f is used to derive its recognition judgment and its measure of priming. To generate a 180 
recognition judgment, random, normally-distributed noise, er, is first added to f to produce the 181 
judgment measure Jr (i.e., Jr = f + er, where er ~ N(0, σr)). If Jr exceeds a particular threshold 182 
of strength, C, the item will be judged old, otherwise it will be judged new. For the priming 183 
task, greater values of f will tend to result in better performance in the task. For example, if 184 
the task is to identify fragmented versions of an object (fragment identification), the greater 185 
the value of f of an item, the greater the level of fragmentation at which it will be identified. 186 
Importantly, however, f is combined with another independent source of random normally-187 
distributed noise, ep, to derive the priming measure (i.e., ID = b – sf + ep, where ID is the 188 
level of fragmentation at which identification occurs; b and s are scaling parameters, b is the 189 
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ID intercept, s is the rate of change in ID with f; and ep ~ N(0, σp)). Both of the task-specific 190 
noise variables er and ep have means equal to zero.  191 
 The SS model can be modified to create two “multiple-systems” versions of the 192 
model—the MS1 and MS2 models. The MS1 model is the same as the SS model except that 193 
one “explicit” memory strength signal, fr, drives recognition (where fr ~ N(µr, σf)), whereas a 194 
separate “implicit” memory signal, fp, drives priming (where fp ~ N(µp, σf)). As in the SS 195 
model, fr and fp are combined with task-specific sources of noise (er and ep) to produce the 196 
recognition judgment (i.e., Jr = fr + er) and priming measure (i.e., ID = b – sfp + ep). 197 
Importantly, however, fr and fp are uncorrelated (i.e., r(fr, fp) = 0) and the mean explicit 198 
strength of old items (µr| old) can vary independently of the mean implicit strength of old items 199 
(µr| old) across individuals/conditions. This allows the model to produce dissociations at the 200 
level of individual items (e.g., stochastic independence, Tulving et al., 1982; Poldrack, 1996) 201 
and also at the level of group/condition (e.g., independent effects of a variable upon 202 
recognition and priming, such as the dissociation in amnesia). Thus, this model represents a 203 
relatively strong interpretation of the idea that explicit and implicit memory systems are 204 
independent (Tulving et al., 1982).  205 
Another model, the MS2 model, represents a weaker interpretation of the idea that 206 
there is independence between systems (Berry et al., 2012). This model is identical to the 207 
MS1 model except that the explicit and implicit strengths of individual items may be 208 
positively correlated (with correlation w). A correlation could arise, for example, via 209 
distinctiveness: a more distinctive item may be better encoded into both the explicit and 210 
implicit memory systems. This gives the MS2 model greater flexibility, allowing it to 211 
reproduce associations between recognition and priming measures at the level of individual 212 
items (like the SS model). In fact, the MS2 model subsumes the SS and MS1 models as 213 
special cases of it, and the MS2 model can therefore, in principle, produce any result that the 214 
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SS and MS1 models can (Berry et al., 2012). When the correlation between fr and fp is 1 (i.e., 215 
r(fr, fp) = 1) and the mean fr, and fp of old items are equal (i.e., µr| old = µp| old), fr = fp, and so the 216 
model reduces to the SS model; when the correlation between fr and fp is zero (i.e., r(fr, fp) = 217 
0), the model reduces to the MS1 model (Berry et al., 2012). 218 
 219 
Model fitting 220 
Models were fit using maximum likelihood estimation (full details are given in Berry 221 
et al., 2012). The likelihood of each identification level (ID) and judgment (Z) combination is 222 
given by the following function: 223 
 224 
 (      )   [ (  |        σ     
 )   (    |         σ     
 )]   (      –   
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 )        225 
 226 
where X = old, new;   is the cumulative normal distribution function;   is the normal density 227 
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  are the mean and variance of the conditional 228 
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 233 
where  r| new = 0 when X = new, and  r| old   0 when X = old;  p| new = 0 when X = new, and  p| 234 
old   0 when X = old. In the SS model,  r| old  =  p| old  =  old, and w = 1. In the MS1 model, w 235 
= 0; in the MS2 model, 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. 236 
In fitting the models to the data, an automated procedure was used to find the 237 
parameter values that maximise the summed log likelihood across trials. A full list of 238 
parameters (both free and fixed) is given in Table 1. Certain parameter values are non-239 
identifiable and their value was therefore fixed such that they act as scaling parameters (as in 240 
Berry et al., 2012): SS model, µnew = 0; MS1/MS2 models, µr| new = µp| new = 0; M(ep) = M(er) 241 
= 0; σf = σr = √0.5; finally, the value of s in the MS1 and MS2 models was fixed to that of the 242 
SS model. Fixing σf and σr to √0.5 means that the standard deviation of Jr is equal to one 243 
(because σJr = (σf
2
 + σr
2
)), and  r| old can therefore be interpreted as d′. We have previously 244 
shown that whether s is fixed or free to vary in the MS1 and MS2 models does not affect their 245 
fit (Berry et al., 2012). 246 
This leaves five free parameters in the SS model: µold, the mean strength of the old 247 
item distribution; C, the “old” judgment criterion; b, the ID intercept; s the rate of change in 248 
the ID level with changes in f; and σp, the variance of ep, the noise associated with the 249 
priming task. The MS1 model also has five free parameters: µr| old, the mean explicit memory 250 
strength of the old item distribution; µp| old, the mean implicit memory strength of the old item 251 
distribution; C, the “old” judgment criterion; b, the ID intercept; and σp, the variance of ep. 252 
The MS2 model has six free parameters: µr| old, the mean explicit memory strength of the old 253 
item distribution; µp| old, the mean implicit memory strength of the old item distribution; C, 254 
 14 
 
 
the “old” judgment criterion; b, the ID intercept; σp, the variance of ep; and w, the correlation 255 
between fr and fp. 256 
It is usually preferable to fit the models to each participant’s data, however, this was 257 
not possible for all participants because the model parameters could not be estimated for 258 
participants who did not make at least one hit, miss, false alarm, or correct rejection response. 259 
Accordingly, the models were fit to 1) the data aggregated across the 24 participants within 260 
each group, and also 2) to each individual’s data, providing that the individual made at least 261 
one hit, miss, false alarm and correct rejection response (n CON group = 19; n KOR group = 262 
15). We report the AIC and BIC measures of fit because both are frequently reported in 263 
model comparisons. We place more emphasis on the AIC because our previous investigations 264 
indicate that the true generative model can be more reliably identified with this measure 265 
(Berry et al., 2012). 266 
Given the best fitting parameter values for a model, the expected model results can be 267 
calculated analytically as 268 
  269 
P(hit) = 1 −  (C − r| old)  
P(false alarm) = 1 −  (C)  
d′ = r| old  
E[ID| new] = b  
E[ID| old] = b − sp| old  
Priming effect = sp| old  
 270 
The expected values of ID conditional on judgment Z are given by the following 271 
function: 272 
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2
 + σr
2
). j = 1 when Z = N, and j = 2 when Z = O; C0 = -∞, C1 = C and C2 = ∞. 273 
Thus, the equation gives the expected ID of hits (E[ID| H]) when X = old and Z = O; it gives 274 
the expected ID of false alarms (E[ID| F]) when X = new and Z = O. Similarly, the equation 275 
gives the expected ID of misses (E[ID| M]) when X = old and Z = N; and gives the expected 276 
RT of correct rejections (E[ID| CR]) when X = new and Z = N. 277 
 In the data, because the mean ID for items judged old/new are weighted means, the 278 
expected ID for items judged old/new are given by the weighted expected IDs to hits and 279 
false alarms (items judged old), or misses and correct rejections (items judged old); hence 280 
 281 
 [          
 ( ) [       ( ) [      
 ( )    ( )
                
and 282 
 [          
[(   ( )  [       [   ( )  [       
   ( )   ( )
     
 283 
The overall fluency effect (see below) can be calculated as E[ID| Z = N] – E[ID| Z = O].  284 
 We should note that the ID response variable is discrete, but is modeled here as 285 
continuous (because fp ~ N(µp, σf) and ID = b – sfp + ep). To justify this way of modeling ID, 286 
parameter recovery simulations were carried out. In these simulations, first, recognition 287 
judgment and ID data (for 10,000 old/new items) was simulated from a given model. The 288 
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parameter values used for this were the mean estimated parameter values for the KOR group 289 
(given on the right-hand side of Table 1). The simulated ID values were then rounded to the 290 
nearest integer; if the value was less than 1 or greater than 10 then it was rounded to 1 or 10, 291 
respectively, thereby producing discretized ID data. The simulated ID and judgment data 292 
were then fit by the models as described above and the estimates of the free parameters were 293 
compared to the values of the parameters that were originally used to simulate the data (i.e., 294 
the true parameter values). For all models, the estimated parameter values matched the true 295 
parameter values. This demonstrates that the parameters of the models can still be recovered, 296 
even though the ID data are discrete. 297 
Another issue concerns the function used to relate fp to ID level. The amount of a test 298 
picture revealed across levels varies by an exponential function whereas the equation relating 299 
ID level to fp in the models is linear. It is possible that an alternative function relating ID to fp 300 
would provide a more complete characterisation of the ID data and improve the performance 301 
of all of the models. However, most important for current purposes is that ID is modeled as a 302 
monotonically decreasing function of fp in all models. We chose to model the ID variable in 303 
this way for consistency with previous applications of the models, and for ease of model 304 
specification.  305 
 306 
Model predictions 307 
Three key predictions are made by the SS model. These predictions follow from the 308 
assumption that greater values of f tend to lead to a greater likelihood of an old judgment and 309 
also better performance in the priming task (i.e., greater values of Jr and lower values of ID, 310 
see Fig. 2). Prediction 1 is that, given a deficit in recognition in amnesic individuals, a deficit 311 
in priming should also be evident. This is because changes in the mean f of old items (µold) 312 
will tend to affect overall levels of both recognition and priming. However, the effect on 313 
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priming can be smaller in magnitude than for recognition because of the greater variance of 314 
the noise associated with the priming task that is typically assumed (Berry et al., 2006). The 315 
MS1 and MS2 models can reproduce any pattern of recognition and priming, and so do not 316 
make this prediction in advance.  317 
Predictions 2 and 3 concern performance in the priming task when broken down by 318 
recognition response (Fig. 2). Prediction 2 is that, within old and new items, items that are 319 
judged old are likely to be identified at greater levels of fragmentation than items judged new 320 
(this is often referred to as a fluency effect, Conroy et al., 2005): Items with values of Jr that 321 
exceed the criterion C are judged old and tend to have larger fs than items judged new. 322 
Because the same f drives identification, items judged old will tend to be identified at more 323 
fragmented levels. Prediction 3 concerns the priming effect for items judged new. This effect 324 
has been reported in numerous studies and on the surface appears to indicate that recognition 325 
and priming have distinct memorial bases since priming occurs in the absence of overt 326 
recognition (Berry et al., 2008a). The SS model predicts that the magnitude of the priming 327 
effect (i.e., the identification advantage of all old items relative to new items) will be greater 328 
than the priming effect within the subset of items judged new (i.e., the identification 329 
advantage for old items judged new relative to new items judged new). This is because values 330 
of Jr tend to be greater for old items than new items, even within the subset of items judged 331 
new. However, the difference in Jr between all old and new items is greater than the 332 
difference in Jr between old and new items within the subset of items judged new (see Fig. 2). 333 
Because differences in Jr tend to reflect differences in f, the priming effect across all items 334 
will tend to be greater than the priming effect within the subset of items judged new. (Though 335 
differences in Jr do not always reflect differences in f as is the case, for example, with false-336 
alarm and miss responses, see Berry et al., 2008a.) Predictions 2 and 3 are not made by the 337 
MS1 model because the identification RT and Jr are uncorrelated within item type (see Figure 338 
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2). The MS2 model can produce the same results as the SS model with regard to Predictions 2 339 
and 3, but the greater flexibility of this model means that it does not make these predictions in 340 
advance. 341 
 342 
Results 343 
SS model prediction 1 344 
Recognition memory was significantly lower in the Korsakoff (KOR) group (n = 24) 345 
than the control (CON) group (n  = 24) (Figs. 3a and 4a): Pr, t(46) = 9.31, P < .001 (Cohen’s 346 
d = 2.69); d′, t(46) = 8.21, P < .001 (KOR group, d′ = 1.00, SE = 0.17; CON group, d′ = 2.64, 347 
SE = 0.11), consistent with the memory disorder in these individuals. Recognition was 348 
reliably greater than chance (i.e., d′ or Pr > 0) in both groups (ts > 5.31, ds > 1.08), and there 349 
was no significant difference in response bias (C) between the groups, t(46) = 1.23, P = .23, d 350 
= 0.36: M C, KOR group = 0.50, SE = 0.21; M C, CON group = 0.23, SE = 0.08. 351 
Priming was calculated as the mean identification level for new items minus the mean 352 
identification level for old items. Both groups showed reliable (i.e., greater than zero) levels 353 
of priming: KOR group, M = 0.35, SE = 0.11, t(23) = 3.18, P =.004, d = 0.65; CON group, M 354 
= 0.68, SE = 0.14, t(23) = 4.78, P < .001, d = 0.98 (Fig. 3b and 4a). Crucially, priming was 355 
significantly lower in the KOR group than the CON group, t(46) = 1.84, P = .036 (one-tailed; 356 
d = 0.53), as predicted by the SS model. Furthermore, there was no significant difference in 357 
the mean identification level for new items across groups (Fig. 3b), t(46) = 0.74, P = .47, d = 358 
0.21, which indicated that any difference in priming across groups could not be attributed to 359 
differences in baseline levels of performance in the task. Identifications were made at all 360 
possible fragmentation levels (Range = 1-10 in both groups; interquartile range, KOR group 361 
= 5-8; CON group = 4-8). 362 
 363 
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SS model predictions 2 and 3 364 
To test Predictions 2 and 3, the identification level of each item at test was analysed 365 
according to the four possible recognition responses: a correct rejection is a “new” judgment 366 
to a new item, a false alarm is an “old” judgment to a new item, a miss is a “new” judgment 367 
to an old item, and a hit is an “old” judgment to an old item (Fig. 3c). A subset of participants 368 
made no responses in at least one of the four response categories, and so they were not 369 
included in the following analyses. There were five participants from the CON group: one 370 
had a hit rate of 1 and four had a false alarm rate of 0. Nine participants were also excluded 371 
from the KOR group on this basis: one had a hit rate of 1, one had a false alarm rate of 1, and 372 
seven had a false alarm rate of 0. The priming scores in the excluded participants were 373 
slightly higher than in the full set of participants (KOR group, M = 0.45; CON group, M = 374 
0.89). In the CON group, the excluded participants tended to have slightly higher recognition 375 
scores (d′ = 3.17, Pr = 0.82), however, in the KOR group, the recognition scores were similar 376 
to the pre-exclusion group mean (d′ = 1.07, Pr = 0.17). The excluded KOR participants did 377 
not appreciably differ from the pre-exclusion KOR group in terms of age (M = 49.33 years), 378 
NART-IQ (M = 89.00), RBMT (M = 6.22), or education (M = 4.11). Listwise removal of 379 
these participants did not result in any qualitative changes in the recognition and priming 380 
differences reported, with the exception that the difference in the priming effects between the 381 
groups was only marginal, t(32) = 1.51, P = .07, d = 0.53 (one-tailed) (KOR group: M = 0.30, 382 
SE = 0.14; CON group: M = 0.64, SE = 0.16); thus, there is a need for a little caution in the 383 
claim of a deficit in priming in this KOR group. However, the priming effect in the subsetted 384 
KOR group (d = 0.52) was still smaller than that of that of the CON group (d = 0.90) and was 385 
only marginally significantly different from chance, t(14) = 2.09, P = .055, which is, at least, 386 
still consistent with a deficit. 387 
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As predicted by the SS model (Prediction 2), in the KOR group, mean identification 388 
levels for items judged old were lower than those of items judged new within new and old 389 
items: ID(correct rejection) vs. ID(false alarm), t(14) = 3.04, P = .009, d = 0.42; ID(miss) vs. 390 
ID(hit), t(14) = 3.98, P = .001, d = 0.74 (Figure 4b). Furthermore, as predicted by the SS 391 
model (Prediction 3), the magnitude of the priming effect for items judged new (calculated as 392 
ID(correct rejection) − ID(miss)) was significantly lower than the priming effect for items 393 
judged new in the KOR group, t(14) = 2.51, P = .025, d = 0.51. However, the priming effect 394 
for items judged new was not reliable in this group, t(14) = 0.083, P = 0.94, d = 0.02. Similar 395 
trends regarding Predictions 2 and 3 were evident in the CON group, however, these were not 396 
reliable (Figure 4b): Prediction 2, ID(correct rejection) vs. ID(false alarm), t(18) = 1.50, P 397 
= .15, d = 0.23; ID(miss) vs. ID(hit), t(18) = 1.29, P = .21, d = 0.15; Prediction 3, t(18) = 1.18, 398 
P = .25, d = 0.28. The priming effect for items judged new was, however, reliable in the CON 399 
group, t(18) = 2.89, P = .01, d = 0.29. A 2 (Item Type: old, new) × 2 (Judgment: old, new) × 400 
2 (Group: CON, KOR) ANOVA was also conducted on the identification levels. There was a 401 
significant main effect of Judgment, F(1, 32) = 21.23, p < .001, ηp
2
 =.40, indicating that 402 
identification levels tended be lower for items judged old versus new. No other main effects 403 
or interactions were significant (main effect of Item Type: F(1, 32) = 3.28, p = .08; all other 404 
Fs < 2.33, ps > .137, ηp
2
s < .09). 405 
 406 
Model fits 407 
Table 2 shows the fit of the models to the data and Table 1 shows the best fitting 408 
parameter estimates of the SS, MS1, and MS2 models. When fit to the data aggregated across 409 
participants, the SS model provided the best fit to the CON group (indicated by the lowest 410 
AIC value in Table 2), but the MS2 model provided the best fit to the KOR group. However, 411 
the differences in AIC between the SS and MS2 models are very small (a difference of 1.2 for 412 
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the CON group, and 0.3 for the KOR group) indicating that both models fit the data almost as 413 
well as each other (Burnham and Anderson, 2002). Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, the 414 
best-fitting value of w in the MS2 model was equal to 1, and the values of µr| old and µp| old 415 
were also very similar within groups, suggesting that the MS2 model fits the data best when it 416 
behaves more like the SS model. When the models were fit to each individual, the SS model 417 
provided the best fit to both groups (Table 2), and the AIC was substantially smaller for the 418 
SS model compared to the MS1 and MS2 models (i.e., > 10), indicating substantial support 419 
for the SS model (Burnham and Anderson, 2002). The majority of participants in each group 420 
were best fit by the SS model, with the remainder being best fit by the MS1 model (Fig. 5). 421 
The BIC results also tended to support the SS model (Table 2 and Fig. 5).  422 
The expected model results are indicated by the symbols in Figures 3 and 4. All 423 
models closely reproduced the key trends in the data: recognition and priming were lower in 424 
the KOR group than the CON group (Prediction 1); the SS and MS2 models predicted non-425 
zero differences between ID(correct rejection) and ID(false alarm), ID(miss) and ID(hit) 426 
(Prediction 2), and also between priming overall and for items judged new (Prediction 3) (Fig. 427 
4). The MS1 model did not, however, predict any of these differences (Fig. 4).  428 
Data from individual patients who show normal priming despite a complete absence 429 
of recognition memory (e.g., patient E.P., Hamann and Squire, 1997; Stefanacci et al., 2000; 430 
Conroy et al., 2005) is particularly challenging for single-system accounts (Berry et al., 2012). 431 
Three densely amnesic patients from this study who showed priming despite performing 432 
at/near chance in recognition yielded results that did not clearly provide evidence for any 433 
model, but it is important to stress that their results were not incompatible with the SS model 434 
(Figures 6 and 7, patients A-C). Patient A was female, 51 years of age, with a NART-IQ 435 
score of 109, RBMT score of 4, and education level of 5; patient B was male, 54 years of age, 436 
with a NART-IQ score of 101, RBMT score of 2, and education level of 5; and patient C was 437 
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male, 59 years of age, with a NART-IQ score of 87, RBMT score of 12, and education level 438 
of 2.  439 
Patients B and C were best fit by the MS1 model, and patient A by the SS model 440 
(though the differences in AIC between the best fitting models were small—less than 4). The 441 
mean priming effect in this subgroup was equal to M = 0.59 (SE = 0.20), which is lower than 442 
the priming effect shown in the CON group (M = 0.68, SE = 0.14), but still within the 95% 443 
confidence interval of the CON group mean (Fig. 4). From panels (a) and (b) of Figure 7, it is 444 
evident that the MS1 and MS2 models closely fit the recognition and priming results, 445 
whereas the SS model predicts a small amount of recognition in these patients, and a lower 446 
magnitude of priming than was evident in these individuals. From panels (b) and (c) it is 447 
evident that 1) priming in patient A, but not patients B and C, was below the lower 95% 448 
confidence interval of mean priming in the CON group; 2) all patients showed a fluency 449 
effect within old items, and patients A and C, but not patient B, showed a fluency effect 450 
within new items; and 3) patients A and B, but not patient C, showed a greater priming effect 451 
than the priming effect for items judged new. Thus, results (2) and (3), and to a lesser extent 452 
result (1), are largely compatible with the predictions of the SS model (and also the MS2 453 
model). It is noteworthy that the SS model is able to reproduce a substantial priming effect in 454 
patient B despite very low recognition.  455 
 456 
Discussion 457 
Contrary to longstanding views that recognition memory and repetition priming are 458 
driven by distinct memory systems (Squire, 2009), this study showed that numerous results in 459 
amnesic patients could be predicted in advance by a single-system model: 1) reliable deficits 460 
in recognition and priming were found relative to the controls; 2) items judged old were 461 
identified at greater levels of fragmentation than items judged new within both old and new 462 
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items; 3) the magnitude of the priming effect overall was greater than the priming effect for 463 
items judged new (though note that priming for items judged new was not reliable in the 464 
KOR group). Findings (2) and (3) were not predicted by the MS1 model, but were 465 
reproduced by the MS2 model. The AIC and BIC model evidence measures, however, 466 
indicated that there was greater support for the SS model than the MS2 model. Thus, overall, 467 
the data from the amnesic patients favored the SS model over the MS1 and MS2 models. 468 
Findings (2) and (3) are therefore in agreement with a previous study that found similar 469 
results in normal adults (Berry et al., 2012).  470 
The deficit in priming found in the KOR group in this study contrasts with the widely 471 
held view that priming is preserved in amnesia. Although priming is frequently found to be 472 
preserved in amnesia (Gabrieli, 1998), many studies, like ours, have also reported deficits 473 
(Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1968; Cermak et al., 1993; Verfaellie et al., 1996; Ostergaard, 474 
1999; Verfaellie and Cermak, 1999; Meier et al., 2009). When Korsakoff patients are 475 
specifically considered, priming deficits are often reported when the priming task is picture 476 
fragment completion (Hayes et al., 2012). There are different interpretations of such priming 477 
deficits. In KS, one account is that they reflect visuoperceptual impairments (see Hayes et al., 478 
2012). However, such an account does not appear to explain the priming deficit found in this 479 
study because baseline levels of identification (fragment identification levels for new items) 480 
did not differ between the KOR and CON groups, suggesting that the visuoperceptual 481 
abilities of the groups were appropriately matched.  482 
One possible multiple-systems interpretation of the deficit in priming is that priming 483 
is greater in the CON group because these individuals use their greater capacity for explicit 484 
memory to retrieve studied items from memory during the identification portion of a trial; 485 
doing so increases the magnitude of priming relative to the amnesic patients (Squire et al., 486 
1985). Although possible, there is evidence to suggest that such an account is unlikely to 487 
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apply to our data. For example, this type of explicit contamination of fragment identification 488 
performance is deemed more likely to occur (and be more effective) when participants 489 
identify fragments at both study and test. Under these conditions, an association between the 490 
fragment and the picture name can be formed at study and then be recalled at test (Verfaellie 491 
et al., 1996). In our study, however, participants only identified fragments at test, and so there 492 
was no opportunity for specific fragment-picture name associations to be formed at study. 493 
Moreover, in experiments using a CID-R task with normal adults, it has been found that even 494 
under conditions that appear optimal for using an explicit retrieval strategy in a CID-R task 495 
(i.e., informing the participant whether the upcoming trial will contain an old or new item), 496 
there was no evidence of greater priming than under typical testing conditions (Ward et al., 497 
2013) (for a similar finding see also Brown et al., 1991; see also Ostergaard, 1998, 1999, for 498 
a discussion of explicit contamination in a similar task). 499 
The SS model explains the deficits in the KOR group as arising from the weaker 500 
strength of a single underlying memory signal for studied items relative to the CON group. 501 
Interestingly, the effect of KS was larger on recognition than on priming (Cohen’s d, 502 
recognition = 2.69, priming = 0.53), and this was captured by the SS model (Cohen’s d, 503 
recognition = 2.27, priming = 0.51). The SS model is able to predict this interaction because 504 
there is not a one-to-one mapping between strength and performance; the signal is scaled 505 
differently, and subjected to different sources of noise for each task. That a single memory 506 
strength signal is expressed differently in two tasks in the SS model is conceptually similar to 507 
other models in which a single underlying memory trace is accessed in different ways 508 
depending upon the retrieval process (e.g., Greve et al., 2010). The difference in effect sizes 509 
predicted by the SS model is one possible explanation for why deficits are more frequently 510 
found in recognition than priming in amnesia. Consistent with this is the finding that priming 511 
tasks are typically less reliable than recognition tasks (Buchner and Wippich, 2000); indeed, 512 
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the reliability of the recognition and priming tasks in our study tended to confirm this (see 513 
Materials and Methods).  514 
In the CON group, numerical trends were found in support of predictions (2) and (3), 515 
but these were not reliable. This is most likely due to low power: The number of misses and 516 
false alarms in the CON group was relatively low (CON group: median = 5 misses, 2 false 517 
alarms; vs. KOR group: median = 16 misses, 11 false alarms), and so the variability in 518 
identification levels for these responses was relatively high (Figure 3c). Clear evidence of 519 
predictions (2) and (3) in normal adults has, however, been found across three experiments by 520 
Berry et al. (2012) with normal adults. They used a greater number of stimuli than this study 521 
(72-150 vs. 40 old/new items) and overall levels of recognition were lower (d′s < 1.5 vs. d′ = 522 
2.64), which resulted in more false alarms and misses. 523 
One potential concern with the CID-R task is that the identification portion of the trial 524 
may affect the recognition judgment. This may be deemed likely since recognition and 525 
priming trials are necessarily interleaved due to the nature of the task. Early dual-process 526 
theories of recognition proposed that perceptual fluency can act as one basis of recognition 527 
(Mandler, 1980; Jacoby and Dallas, 1981), and studies have shown that the probability of an 528 
old judgment to an item is greater if the rate at which it clarifies from a mask is fast rather 529 
than slow (Johnston et al., 1991). In other words, a relatively fluent identification can be 530 
attributed to prior exposure. It is therefore possible that the relations between priming and 531 
recognition that we find are accentuated by the CID-R task. However, there is evidence from 532 
similar studies that have used blocked designs, which demonstrate that the within-item 533 
recognition-priming measure associations of the kind observed in this study are not 534 
dependent upon the interleaved nature of the CID-R task (Ostergaard, 1998; Sheldon and 535 
Moscovitch, 2010) (see also discussion in
 
Berry et al., 2012). 536 
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An important question is whether the SS model extends to other explicit tasks that are 537 
more reliant upon recollection (i.e., remembering prior context). Berry et al. (2012) found 538 
some evidence for this using a modified CID-R task with remember-know judgments 539 
(Tulving, 1985). Remember judgments are widely thought to measure a recollection memory 540 
process (Yonelinas, 2002). Berry et al. (2012) found that identification RTs to items given 541 
remember judgments were faster than for those given know judgments (commonly thought to 542 
measure a familiarity process), and this was predicted by the SS model. In future research it 543 
will be important to determine if the model extends to other tasks that are reliant upon 544 
recollection such as source memory.  545 
Finally, a remaining issue is whether the SS model can explain the opposite kind of 546 
dissociation to that reported in amnesia, namely, evidence of brain regions that support 547 
priming but not recognition. Although initial neuropsychological studies indicated that the 548 
right occipital lobe was such a region (e.g., Gabrieli et al., 1995), subsequent investigations 549 
have not corroborated this (Yonelinas et al., 2001; Kroll et al., 2003). Nevertheless, it is clear 550 
that regions outside the medial temporal lobe are involved in priming (and also recognition) 551 
(Schacter et al., 2007), and one avenue for future research will be to determine how the 552 
activity of different regions maps onto the single strength signal in the SS model. 553 
To conclude, the results from amnesic patients supported the predictions of the SS 554 
model. Numerous results were inconsistent with the MS1 model; this suggests that 555 
recognition and priming are not driven by completely independent explicit and implicit 556 
memory signals. Like the SS model, the MS2 model could account for the data. The MS2 557 
model explains the deficits in recognition and priming in amnesia as reductions in the 558 
strength of both the explicit and implicit memory signals. There is also a substantial degree of 559 
association between the explicit and implicit memory strengths of a given item according to 560 
this model. The SS model, however, tended to be preferred according to model evidence 561 
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measures and could predict the majority of results in amnesia in advance. Thus, the SS model 562 
appears to provide the most parsimonious account for the pattern of recognition and priming 563 
in amnesia found in this study.  564 
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Figure Legends 690 
Figure 1. Example of a fragmented stimulus used in the identification portion of a CID-R 691 
trial at test. An object was initially presented at a highly fragmented level (level 1). 692 
Participants were instructed to try to identify the item at the most fragmented level they could. 693 
If the item could not be identified, a button press revealed a less fragmented version of the 694 
object (up to level 10). 695 
 696 
Figure 2. Model representations and Predictions 2 and 3. The top panels illustrate the 697 
relationship between the ID (identification level) and Jr variables in the models. The ellipses 698 
represent bivariate normal distributions of each class of item (old or new), cut horizontally 699 
and centred on a point that represents the mean Jr and ID for that class of item. Prediction 2 700 
concerns whether ID levels are facilitated for items judged old within new and old items, that 701 
is, whether the mean ID of false alarms is less than that of correct rejections (i.e., CR – FA), 702 
and whether the mean ID of hits is less than of misses (i.e., MISS – HIT), where a correct 703 
rejection is a “new” judgment to a new item, a false alarm is an “old” judgment to a new item, 704 
a miss is a “new” judgment to an old item, and a hit is an “old” judgment to an old item. 705 
Prediction 3 concerns whether the priming effect overall (across all items) is greater than the 706 
priming effect for items judged new. Priming is calculated as mean ID(new items) − mean 707 
ID(old items); priming for items judged new is calculated as mean ID(CR) − mean ID(FA). 708 
The SS model predicts positive differences between ID(CR) – ID(MISS), ID(MISS) – 709 
ID(HIT), and Priming – Priming items judged new. The MS1 model predicts no differences. 710 
The MS2 model predicts positive differences when the explicit and implicit strengths of an 711 
item are positively correlated (i.e., w > 0), and predicts no differences when there is no 712 
correlation (i.e., w = 0). 713 
 714 
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Figure 3. Recognition and priming task performance. (a). Proportion of hit and false alarm 715 
responses in the KOR and CON groups. (b). Fragment identification performance according 716 
to whether the object at test is actually new or old, or judged new or old. (c). Fragment 717 
identification performance classified according to the recognition response (correct rejection 718 
[CR], miss, false alarm [FA], hit) in the KOR and CON groups. Bars indicate experimental 719 
data (error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of the mean). Symbols indicate the 720 
expected result from each model when fit to data aggregated across individuals ((a) and (b)) 721 
(because the data in these figures are derived from all of the participants), or the mean 722 
expected result from each model when fit to each individual’s data (c) (because the data in 723 
these figures are derived from the subset of participants with responses in all four recognition 724 
categories). In panel (c), the letters represent the individuals in each group. SS = single-725 
system model; MS1 = multiple-systems-1 model; MS2 = multiple-systems-2 model.  726 
 727 
Figure 4. Model prediction results. (a). Recognition discrimination (Pr: proportion of hits 728 
minus proportion of false alarms) and priming (i.e., fragment identification advantage for old 729 
objects) for the KOR and CON groups. Fluency effects (i.e., fragment identification 730 
advantage for objects judged old) across all items are also presented. Prediction 1 of the SS 731 
model is confirmed by lower recognition and priming in the KOR group than the CON group. 732 
(b). Differences in the ID level for items judged old versus judged new within new and old 733 
item types, and differences in the priming effect (overall) and the priming effect of items 734 
judged new. Predictions 2 and 3 of the SS model are confirmed in the KOR group. Bars 735 
indicate experimental data (error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of the mean). 736 
Symbols indicate the expected result from each model when fit to data aggregated across 737 
individuals (row a) (because the data in this row are derived from all of the participants), or 738 
the mean expected result from each model when fit to each individual’s data (row b) (because 739 
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the data in this row are derived from the subset of participants with responses in all four 740 
recognition categories). SS = single-system model; MS1 = multiple-systems-1 model; MS2 = 741 
multiple-systems-2 model; KOR = Korsakoff group; CON = Control group. 742 
 743 
Figure 5. Model selection results. Each bar represents the percentage of participants best fit 744 
by each model according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian 745 
Information Criterion (BIC) in the CON and KOR groups. The SS model was the best fitting 746 
model for the majority of participants, with the remainder being best fit by the MS1 model. 747 
 748 
Figure 6. Best fitting models for each participant (according to the AIC; individual level fits). 749 
The best fitting models are plotted according to recognition (Pr) and priming (M 750 
identification new – M identification old) performance (row a) and the difference in ID levels 751 
for items judged old and new (i.e., fluency effects) within old and new items (row b). It is 752 
evident that the participants in the KOR group who were best fit by the MS1 model tended to 753 
show priming (or recognition) in the near-absence of recognition (or priming). The MS1 754 
model can reproduce such a pattern because the µr| old and µp| old parameters can vary 755 
independently of one another. In the CON group, there were also participants who were best 756 
fit by the MS1 model even though they showed relatively large positive recognition and 757 
priming effects. These participants tended to show an absence of fluency effects (or even a 758 
negative fluency effect) within old or new items (row b, right panel). Because fp and fr are 759 
uncorrelated in the MS1 model, it does not predict fluency effects within old/new items. Thus, 760 
the participants best fit by the MS1 model appeared to exhibit results that were consistent 761 
with its predictions. The letters A, B and C above the points in the KOR group label patients 762 
who showed priming effects despite performing very close to chance in recognition. 763 
 764 
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Figure 7. Performance of the KOR group patients A, B, and C (as labelled in Fig. 3c and 6). 765 
(a) Recognition. (b) Priming. (c) Differences in ID levels for items judged new and old within 766 
old and new items (i.e., fluency effects), and differences in the priming effect (overall) and 767 
the priming effect of items judged new (Predictions 2 and 3 of the SS model). Bars denote 768 
data, and symbols indicate the expected result from each model when fit to the data from 769 
each individual. The dashed lines in (a) and (b)  indicate the lower 95% confidence interval 770 
for the mean recognition and priming performance, respectively, in the CON group (from Fig. 771 
4). SS = single-system model; MS1 = multiple-systems-1 model; MS2 = multiple-systems-2 772 
model.  773 
 774 
Table legends 775 
Table 1. Mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of the model parameters. A value 776 
preceded by an equals sign indicates that the value was fixed, otherwise it was free to vary in 777 
fitting the data. 778 
Table 2. Goodness of Fit Values for the Models. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 779 
(Akaike, 1973), calculated as AIC = −2ln(L) + 2P, where P = p × z is the total number of free 780 
parameters for each fit, p is the number of free parameters for each model, and z is the 781 
(effective) number of participants modeled in each experiment; BIC = Bayesian Information 782 
Criterion (Schwarz, 1978), calculated as BIC = −2ln(L) + Pln(q), where q is the number of 783 
observations; q(Aggregated, KOR group) = 1920, q(Aggregated, CON group) = 1920, 784 
q(Individual, KOR group) = 1200, q(Individual, CON group) = 1520. For the aggregate fits, 785 
data from all 24 participants are modeled as if from one participant (hence z = 1). For the 786 
individual fits, it was not possible to model participants who had zero hit, miss, false alarm or 787 
correct rejection responses (hence zs < 24). A smaller AIC or BIC value indicates greater 788 
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support for a model. BOLD indicates that the model fit the data best according to the AIC 789 
measure.  790 
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Table 1  
Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parenthesis) of the Model Parameters. 
  Aggregate Fits  Individual Fits 
  SS  MS1  MS2  SS  MS1  MS2 
Parameter Meaning KOR CON  KOR CON  KOR CON  KOR CON  KOR CON  KOR CON 
 r| old M(fr| old) 0.69 2.48  0.72 2.49  0.72 2.49  1.06 2.66  1.01 2.66  1.01 2.66 
           (0.76) (0.57)  (0.83) (0.57)  (0.83) (0.57) 
 p| old M(fp| old) = r|old = r|old  0.51 2.18  0.51 2.18  = r|old = r|old  0.83 2.54  0.92 2.53 
              (0.66) (1.20)  (0.69) (1.15) 
w r(fr, fp) = 1 = 1  = 0 = 0  1.00 1.00  = 1 = 1  = 0 = 0  0.82 0.62 
                 (0.35) (0.43) 
C Judgment criterion 0.69 1.45  0.71 1.45  0.71 1.46  0.80 1.55  0.77 1.55  0.77 1.55 
           (0.83) (0.43)  (0.78) (0.43)  (0.78) (0.43) 
b ID intercept 6.51 6.23  6.45 6.18  6.45 6.18  6.53 6.22  6.53 6.22  6.53 6.22 
           (0.90) (1.47)  (0.89) (1.47)  (0.89) (1.47) 
s ID slope 0.68 0.31  = SS = SS  = SS = SS  0.57 0.25  = SS = SS  = SS = SS 
           (0.55) (0.21)       
σp SD(ep) 1.88 2.36  1.89 2.36  1.88 2.36  1.59 1.73  1.59 1.73  1.58 1.72 
           (0.32) (0.38)  (0.32) (0.38)  (0.32) (0.38) 
σf SD(fr), SD(fp) =1/2 =1/2  =1/2 =1/2  =1/2 =1/2  =1/2 =1/2  =1/2 =1/2  =1/2 =1/2 
σr SD(er) = σf = σf  = σf = σf  = σf = σf  = σf = σf  = σf = σf  = σf = σf 
M(ep) M priming task noise = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0 
M(er) M recognition task 
noise 
= 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0 
 r| new M(fr| new) = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0 
 p| new M(fp| new) = r|new = r|new  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0  = r|new = r|new  = 0 = 0  = 0 = 0 
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Table 2  
Goodness of Fit Values for the Models. 
 
 
 
SS 
  
MS1 
 
 MS2 
Data Fit Group p ln(L) AIC BIC 
 
p ln(L) AIC BIC 
 
p ln(L) AIC BIC 
Aggregated  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Korsakoff 
(z = 1) 
5 -5172.7 10355.4 10383.2 
 
5 -5196.7 10403.4 10431.3 
 
6 -5171.5 10355.1 10388.5 
 
Control 
(z = 1) 
5 -5035.2 10080.4 10108.2 
 
5 -5042.7 10095.4 10123.2 
 
6 -5034.8 10081.6 10115.0 
Individual  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Korsakoff 
(z = 15) 
5 -2925.5 6001.1 6382.8 
 
5 -2943.3 6036.7 6418.4 
 
6 -2922.1 6024.2 6482.3 
 
Control 
(z = 19) 
5 -3444.8 7079.6 7585.6 
 
5 -3446.2 7082.4 7588.4 
 
6 -3443.2 7114.5 7721.7 
 
